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language is retained in R.S. 15:461. Since this statute allows,
but does not compel, testimony, it is readily seen that only the
competency phase of the common law rule is removed, leaving
the privilege.8 2 But this privilege is severely limited because the
statute has been interpreted to mean that it belongs only to the
witness spouse, 8 to exercise at his option, which he must do be-
fore the jury. 4 The accused may force his spouse to testify in
his favor,8 5 and if he fails to do so the prosecutor may comment
on this failure.8 6 Thus unless the testimony of the spouse is
especially damning, it would seem that the protection given by
the privilege is negligible because the accused is subject to the
prosecutor's comments, which quite likely will make his situation
worse than if the testimony were given.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case is sound,
for it would seem that the protection of the sanctity of the mari-
tal relationship, indeed the institution of marriage itself, is more
important than an ascertainment of truth in any particular case.
This decision will naturally have no direct effect outside of the
federal courts; however, its indirect influence may be felt in
the state systems. It is hoped that this influence will lead to a
reconsideration of the privilege statute in Louisiana, for it would
seem that the purpose behind the statute is not unlike the rea-
sons advanced by the majority in the instant case to support the
privilege. This purpose cannot be realized, however, as pointed
out in the concurring opinion, unless the privilege is in the hands
of the accused spouse.
Ray C. Muirhead
INCOME TAX - PROFIT ON SALE OF ENDOWMENT AND ANNUITY
POLICIES - CAPITAL GAIN OR ORDINARY INCOME?
Whether the sale of an endowment or annuity insurance
policy to a third person prior to its maturity results in capital
gain or ordinary income to the vendor is left in question by two
32. For a more complete treatment of Louisiana's position and the interpreta-
tion of the statute, see Note, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 427 (1954). This note
is current, as there seems to have been no cases on the points covered since its
writing.
33. State v. McMullan, 223 La. 629, 66 So.2d 574 (1953); State v. Dejean,
159 La. 900, 106 So. 374 (1925) ; State v. Webb, 156 La. 952, 101 So. 338 (1924).
34. State v. McMullan, 223 La. 629, 66 So.2d 574 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 427 (1954).




recent decisions. In Phillips v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. No. 87,
CCH Dec. 23077 (1958), taxpayer transferred, twelve days be-
fore it matured, all his interest in an endowment policy which
he had owned for many years. During this time he had received
substantial dividends on it. The sales price of the policy ex-
ceeded taxpayer's cost basis but was slightly less than its cash
surrender value at the date of the sale. Taxpayer admitted his
major motive in making the transfer was to obtain a capital gain
on the proceeds. In Arnfeld v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 865
(Ct. Cl. 1958), an annuity policy, 'owned for many years, was
sold to a third person three days before it matured. The contract
provided that cash values and death benefits prior to the com-
mencement of annuity payments at maturity should be computed
at the fixed rate of 31 percent compounded annually on amounts
deposited with the insurance company. As in the Phillips case,
the policy was sold at a price in excess of taxpayer's basis, but
slightly less than its cash surrender value at the date of sale.
Taxpayer disposed of the policy to invest the funds in securities
yielding a greater return. The Phillips case held that profit on
sale of an endowment policy is taxable as a capital gain, and that
such profit cannot be considered accrued interest where the ex-
cess of cash value at the date of sale over basis was caused by a
reduction of total premiums due under the policy by mutual in-
surance company dividends.1 In Arnfeld it was held that gain on
sale of an annuity is ordinary income, for taxpayer cannot con-
vert what is essentially interest income into capital gain by a
mere sale. The court found that there was a bona fide sale in
both cases.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that only a gain on the
"sale or exchange" of "capital assets" may be taxed at the favor-
able capital gain rates.2 In general, a taxpayer may arrange his
affairs so as to minimize his taxes, and if his methods are not
merely a sham for the purpose of tax avoidance they will be sus-
tained.8 Some cases indicate that arrangements which minimize
1. The court found that total premiums due under the policy would have ap-
proximately equalled cash surrender value at the date of sale. Thus, any interest
which may have been allowed to taxpayer under the terms of this policy was
negligible. If the policy had provided for such interest, it would have been taxed
as ordinary income.
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1221, 1222; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 117(a)
(1-11). Both Phillips and Arnield were decided under the 1939 code, but the pro-
visions involved in these cases are substantially the same undereither the 1939 or
the 1954 Code. This Note will not deal with Section 1231 assets, nor will capital
losses be considered as a separate problem, for their treatment would be essentially
the same as that of capital gains.
3. Paine v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Fisher v. Cominis-
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taxes, but which have no business purpose, may be treated as a
sham.4 In determining whether a given transaction has a bona
fide business purpose, the courts look to its substance, rather
than its form. 5 Theoretically a transaction which attempts to
convert into capital gains what would normally be ordinary in-
come should not be given effect, even though the transaction
may also have a business purpose.6 Under what circumstances
capital gain rates will be allowed on gains realized from the
sale or exchange of contract rights has long been a problem.
Very few cases have dealt directly with the transfer of rights
under insurance contracts, but transfers of rights under other
types of contracts have been extensively considered by the courts.
Allowance of capital gain on profit resulting from the transfer
of rights under a contract has met with two major objections
by the Commissioner: that the transfer is not a "sale or ex-
change" within the meaning of the Code, and that the considera-
tion received on the transfer is in lieu of ordinary income either
previously accrued, or yet to be earned under the contract rights
transferred.7
Cases dealing with the transfer of rights under certain types
of contracts have conclusively settled whether capital gain or
ordinary income is realized. For instance, if consideration is
received by the taxpayer for the transfer 8 or cancellation 9 of
rights related to a contract for his personal services, the pro-
sioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Clara M. Tully Trust v. Commissioner, 1
T.C. 611 (1943) ; McKee v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 239 (1937). Cf. Allen v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946); Bell's Estate v.
Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943) ; fules J. Reingold, Docket No. 100878
(1937), 10 P-H B.T.A. Memo. Dec. 41319 (1941).
4. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) ; Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473
(1939) Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938).
5. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) ; Griffiths v. Com-
missioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); S. A. Macqueen Co. v. Commissioner, 67 F.2d
857 (3d Cir. 1934) ; Lasky v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 13 (1954), aff'd, 235 F.2d
97 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd, per curiam, 352 U.S. 1027 (1957).
6. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958) ; Hort v. Commis-
sioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1940) ; Burnet v. Hormel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932) ; Rhodes'
Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d
590 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Sorensen v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 321 (1954) ; Shumlin v.
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 407 (1951).
7. Bechly, Sale of a Contract - Capital Gain or Ordinary Income, 35 TAXES
759 (1957).
8. Sorensen v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 321 (1954) ; Jessop v. Commissioner,
16 T.C. 491 (1951) ; Parker v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1355 (1945) ; McFall v.
Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 108 (1936).
9. Lasky v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 13 (1954), aff'd, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir.
1956), aff'd, per curiam, 352 U.S. 1027 (1957) ; Shumlin v. Commissioner, 16
T.C. 407 (1951) ; Williams v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 639 (1945) ; Becken v. Com-
missioner, 5 T.C. 498 (1945) ; Shuster v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 255 (1940),
aff'd, 121 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Gann v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 388 (1940).
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ceeds will be taxed as ordinary income, as they are considered
compensation received in lieu of earnings. Payments by a lessor
to a lessee for surrender of his rights of possession and enjoy-
ment under the lease are considered capital gain to the lessee, 10
but an amount received by a lessor in consideration for the can-
cellation of a real estate lease is regarded as a substitute for
rentals which would have been realized under the lease and is
taxed to the lessor as ordinary income." The owner of a life
estate is held to have an interest in property, for tax purposes,
12
and any profit he receives on the transfer of the whole or a por-
tion of his interest will.be taxed at capital gain rates.' 3
In cases involving the transfer of rights held under certain
other types of contracts the issue of ordinary income versus
capital gain is somewhat less conclusively settled. Where tax-
payer transfers to another all his interest in income-producing
property14 or in a going business,' there is more than an assign-
ment of a contractual right to future income, and capital gain
treatment is generally allowed. But for the transfer of rights
under a contract to be a "sale or exchange," which is required
to achieve capital gain treatment, rights formerly held by the
transferor must exist in the transferee after the transaction.
Thus, where rights are extinguished by a transaction, there is no
"sale or exchange," and a capital gain is not realized.' 6
As to both endowment 17 and annuity" insurance contracts,
10. Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.
1954) ; Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952) ; INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1241.
11. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1940).
12. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
13. Allen v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946)
Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943). Cf. McAllister v.
Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1946).
14. Commissioner v. Goff, 212 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1954).
15. Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Smoak v. Commissioner,
43 B.T.A. 907 (1941).
16. In the following cases it was held that there was an "extinguishment" of
the transferor's rights rather than a "transfer" of them, and the net proceeds were
treated as ordinary income. Commissioner v. The Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d
Cir. 1958) (payment was for cancellation of an exclusive right to purchase a com-
pany's entire output) ; Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.
1953) (amounts were received by a dealer for releasing a manufacturer from a
contractual obligation to sell exclusively to him) ; General Artists Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1953) (transfer agreement provided that rights
under the contract transferred should be cancelled by the transferee). But the
Third Circuit seems to doubt that the person to whom a right is transferred should
affect the determination of whether the transfer was a "sale or exchange." Com-
missioner v. Goff, 212 F.2d 875, 876 (3d Cir. 1954).
17. Avery v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1940).
18. Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Cobbs v. Commis-
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it is clearly established that amounts in excess of total considera-
tion paid, received upon surrender of the policy to the insurance
company, are taxable as ordinary income. But where a life in-
surance policy was transferred for cash to a party other than
the insurance company, a situation very similar to those pre-
sented in the instant cases, it was held that the transferor
realized a capital gain on the transaction. 19 Prior to 1934 re-
demption by a corporation of its outstanding notes or bonds was
not considered a "sale or exchange," and the excess of the re-
demption proceeds over the bond holder's basis was taxed as
ordinary income. 20 But where corporate bonds were sold the
day before they matured for the sole purpose of obtaining capital
gain, seller was held to have realized capital gain even though
the purchaser bought the bonds at par merely to accommodate
the seller, and realized no profit on their redemption.2 1 Life in-
surance and annuity contracts have been held to be in the same
class as bonds. 22 Following these cases it would seem that if an
annuity were sold to a third party several days before it ma-
tured, as in the Arnfeld case, any gain resulting should receive
capital gain treatment.
It would seem that the apparent conflict between the Phillips
and Arnfeld decisions may be rationalized. The insurance poli-
cies involved were certainly within the code definition of capital
assets.28 In deciding the issue of whether there was a bona fide
sale, the courts in the instant cases seemed to be following the
general rule that a taxpayer may act so as to minimize his taxes.
In Phillips the decision that there was a bona fide sale might be
questioned. There the cases requiring a business purpose24 seem
tc have been avoided, for taxpayer conceded that his major pur-
pose was tax reduction. However, in the Arnfeld case it would
seem that the taxpayer did have a bona fide business purpose,
sioner, 39 B.T.A. 642 (1939) ; Hellman v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 901 (1936)
(combined life insurance and annuity contracts).
19. Jules J. Reingold, Docket No. 100878 (1937), 10 P-H B.T.A. Memo. Dec.
41319 (1941).
20. Felin v. Kyle, 102 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1939) ; United States v. Fairbanks,
95 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1938). In 1934 Congress specifically provided that the re-
demption of corporate notes or bonds by the corporation was to be considered an
"exchange." Revenue Act of 1934, § 117(f), 44 STAT. 715. This provision is still
the law. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1232(a); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(f).
21. McKee v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 239 (1937).
22. "In our opinion the surrender of the life insurance and annuity contracts
in the instant case, does not differ in any material respect from the bond trans-
actions in the cases above cited [the court refers to cases cited in note 20 supra]."
Hellman v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 901, 902 (1936).
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a) (1).
24. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
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and that the sale could be sustained even under the business pur-
pose rule. Thus, as there was a sale of a capital asset in each
case,25 the capital gains provisions should have been applied, un-
less the sale had the effect of converting ordinary income into
capital gains.26 It is on this issue that the two courts reach op-
posite results, each of which seems justifiable.
In the Phillips case taxpayer sold his policy for slightly less
than its cash surrender value. The total premiums payable under
the policy from its date of issue to the date of sale approximately
equalled the policy's cash value at the sale date.27 But the divi-
dends which taxpayer had received on his policy during the
period that he had held it, had reduced his basis for the policy
substantially below its cash value, for dividends paid on en-
dowment policies before maturity are not taxed as ordinary in-
come, but reduce the taxpayer's investment in the policy.28 Thus
in Phillips, the court reasoned that to tax the gain on sale of the
policy as ordinary income would be tantamount to taxing divi-
dends received on the policy as ordinary income, which would be
clearly contrary to law.29 The court further reasoned that the
difference between sales price and basis, resulting from mutual
company dividends, could not be considered accrued interest tax-
able as ordinary income, because such dividends are based on
the contingency of company profits after expenses and were not
guaranteed at a stipulated rate as is the normal case with in-
terest. On the other hand the gain realized in the Arnfeld case
was derived completely from amounts accrued at a fixed con-
tractual rate on deposits made with the insurance company.
Such sums are clearly in the nature of accrued interest, and to
apply capital gain rates would be to convert ordinary income into
capital gains.
Where the cost of insurance is dependent upon the insurance
company's profits, the policy holder has, in effect, furnished
venture capital for re-investment by the insurance company.
Ordinarily dividends, that is, amounts paid for the use of venture
capital, are taxed as ordinary income. But the Code provides ex-
ceptional treatment for dividends paid by an insurance com-
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
26. See note 6 supra.
27. See note 1 supra.
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 72(c), (e) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-11(b)
(1956). However, as these sections provide, such dividends are taxable to the
extent that they exceed total premiums or other consideration already paid on the
policy.
29. See note, 28 supra.
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pany to its policy holders. Such dividends are not taxed as
ordinary income, but rather reduce the taxpayer's investment in
the policy.30 The effect of this special treatment would seem to
encourage the furnishing of venture capital to insurance com-
panies for reinvestment by them, for an insurance company will
have greater freedom to reinvest premiums when it is not obli-
gated to pay a fixed return to its policy holders. Therefore, the
special treatment of insurance company dividends appears to be
in accord with the major purpose of the capital gains provisions,
which is to encourage the free flow of investment capital.31
Thus it would seem that a gain on the sale of an annuity or an
endowment policy prior to its maturity should be accorded cap-
ital gains treatment where the policy holder has furnished the
insurance company with venture capital. The mere fact that a
particular policy is an endowment or an annuity should not be
controlling in itself. In Phillips, taxpayer purchased term life
insurance of a stipulated amount plus a promise to pay a fixed
future sum, the net cost of these rights being determined by the
company's profits. It seems that his purchase is like an in-
vestment in the insurance company, and that his position is
analogous to that of an owner. But in Arnfeld the amount of
cash surrender value and term insurance, and the sum to be
applied to the future annuity all depended upon the fixed rate
of return on the deposit made under the contract. The purchaser
of this type of contract is in a position similar to that of a credi-
tor of the insurance company, for the gain on disposal of his
policy is a realization of an accrued return allowed for the use
of money deposited with the company. Thus it seems that the
instant cases are distinguishable, and that the decision in each
is sound.32
Charles B. Sklar
MINERAL RIGHTS -IMPROPER PAYMENT OF DELAY RENTALS -
AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE -ASSUMPTION OF VENDOR'S
OBLIGATIONS BY VENDEE
Landowner, owning only one-fourth of the minerals, executed
a mineral lease to defendants' predecessor in title. Although
30. See note 28 supra.
31. S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 50 (1942); S. Rep. No. 1567,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1938) ; H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 29
(1942).
32. However, since life insurance and annuity contracts have been held to be in
the same class as bonds, it could be argued that a contrary result could have been
reached in the Arnfeld case. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
[Vol. XIX
